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THE CANADIAN SECURITY CERTIFICATE REGIME 
CEPS Special Report/March 2009 
AUDREY MACKLIN
* 
Introduction 
Like other states, Canada is wrestling with the task of devising national security policies that are 
able to withstand allegations that fundamental human rights have been sacrificed at the altar of 
the war on terror. The policy instrument of choice for Canada thus far has been the deportation 
of suspected security threats. The appeal of deportation resides in its capacity to literally expel 
the putative menace from the body politic. In addition, courts have historically denied to non-
citizens enmeshed in immigration proceedings the legal protections afforded to defendants 
(citizen and non-citizen alike) in the criminal justice system. Justifications for this discounting 
of the rights of non-citizens rest on two propositions: the first is the traditional sovereigntist 
insistence that immigration is a privilege and not a right, and so the migrant is disentitled from 
complaining about the process of how that privilege is granted, denied or revoked. Secondly, 
deportation is framed as something qualitatively different from criminal punishment; unlike 
incarceration, deportation does not intrinsically constitute a deprivation of liberty or security of 
the person. Operationally, the significance of these distinctions is that it is easier to deport than 
to prosecute. Non-citizens become more vulnerable targets of state surveillance and sanction 
than citizens, and even where criminal prosecution might be possible, deportation proceedings 
remain more attractive to the state because they erect fewer rights-based impediments to 
enforcement. 
The obvious drawback to this reliance on immigration law is the fact that it only applies to non-
citizens. Citizens suspected of terrorism-related acts can only be tried under criminal law, 
thereby bringing into sharp relief the normative implications of subjecting non-citizens to a 
different and less fair process than citizens for otherwise comparable conduct. Notably, recent 
UK legislation permits the Secretary of State to revoke citizenship of both birthright and 
naturalized citizens where it is “conducive to the public good”.
1 Though rarely used, this 
extravagant extension of ministerial discretion power operates to legally ‘alienate’ the citizen in 
order to render him available for a remedy that can only be inflicted on non-citizens, namely 
deportation. 
This preference for deportation also rests on a curiously parochial premise: despite repeated 
claims by states that terrorism is a problem of global dimensions, the deportation as remedy 
presupposes that removal of a dangerous person from one territory to another will neutralize the 
terrorist threat posed by that individual. Lord Bingham of Cornhill remarked on the dubious 
nature of this assumption in the House of Lords decision in A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary 
of State for the Home Department
2 (Belmarsh Case):  
… [A]llowing a suspected international terrorist to leave our shores and depart to another 
country, perhaps a country as close as France, there to pursue his criminal designs, is hard to 
reconcile with a belief in his capacity to inflict serious injury to the people and interests of this 
country. 
                                                      
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.  
1 British Nationality Act 1981 (c. 61), s. 40(2). 
2 [2004] UKHL 56 at para. 33. 2 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
In other words, to say that there is an immigration aspect to international terrorism should not be 
construed to mean that terrorism is a problem that immigration law can solve. Nevertheless, the 
allure of immigration law seems to outweigh its practical and normative limitations, at least for 
the UK and Canadian governments.  
The purpose of this report is to provide a critical account of Canadian law, policy and practice 
since 2001 regarding the detention and deportation of non-citizens alleged to pose a danger to 
national security. Developments since 2007, when the Supreme Court of Canada declared the 
existing regime unconstitutional, warrant particular attention. 
The Security Certificate Regime 
Within weeks of 11 September 2001, the Canadian government introduced and passed into law 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The draft legislation pre-dated the attacks on the 
United States, and it is telling that the political climate that ensued did not actually affect the 
content of the legislation as much as dampen dissent from opposition politicians and civil 
society. In effect, the Canadian government had already decided to ‘get tougher’ on non-
citizens. The events of 9/11 simply made it easier to do so.  
Under ordinary immigration law, a non-citizen seeking to enter or remain in Canada may be 
inadmissible for various reasons, including non-possession of an entry visa, misrepresentation, 
criminality, violation of human or international rights, health risk, destitution, or risk to national 
security.
3 Inadmissibility on security grounds may be based on “facts for which there are 
reasonable grounds to believe [] have occurred, are occurring or may occur”,
4 and applies in the 
following circumstances: 
34. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds 
for  
(a) engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a democratic 
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada; 
(b) engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government; 
(c) engaging in terrorism; 
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada; 
(e) engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of 
persons in Canada; or 
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). 
Exception 
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect 
of a permanent resident or a foreign national who satisfies the Minister that their 
presence in Canada would not be detrimental to the national interest.  
To appreciate the expansive reach of these provisions, and the attenuated threshold of proof 
required under them, consider that s. 34 (1)(f) permits the labelling and deportation of a person 
qua terrorist if there are reasonable grounds to believe he is, was, or will be a member of an 
organisation that there are reasonable grounds to believe has, does, or will in engage in 
terrorism. 
                                                      
3 See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27, ss. 34-43 (hereafter “IRPA”). 
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A non-citizen facing exclusion or expulsion is generally entitled to an admissibility hearing 
before an adjudicator of the Immigration and Refugee Board. If the person concerned is 
detained (which occurs relatively infrequently), the detention is subject to regular review by an 
adjudicator.  
The Security Certificate regime deviates from this system in various ways. First, if the Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
sign a Security Certificate declaring the person concerned as inadmissible on grounds of 
security, violating international or human rights, serious criminality or organised criminality, 
the named person will be invariably (and in most cases automatically) detained.  
Next, a designated judge of the Federal Court will be tasked with determining whether the 
Security Certificate is ‘reasonable’. This standard of review compounds the low threshold of 
proof described above in relation to s. 34, especially s. 34(1)(f). Meanwhile, the named person 
may apply to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration for protection from removal on the 
basis of a well-founded fear of persecution or substantial risk of torture or cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment if expelled to his country of nationality.
5 Even where the person 
otherwise qualifies for protection, the Minister may deny protection if, “in the opinion of the 
Minister . . . the person should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and 
severity of acts committed or danger to the security of Canada”.
6 This determination will be 
reviewed for its ‘legality’ by the same designated judge.  
If the named person is a permanent resident, his detention will be reviewed every six months by 
the designated judge. If he is a foreign national,
7 IRPA does not mandate any review of the 
detention prior to determination of the Security Certificate’s reasonableness. IRPA places no 
statutory limit on the length of detention, except to state that the person concerned may apply 
for release anytime to permit departure from Canada. If a Security Certificate is upheld as 
reasonable, the judge may order the release of the named person 120 days later, “if satisfied that 
the foreign national will not be removed from Canada within a reasonable time and that the 
release will not pose a danger to national security or to the safety of any person”.
8 Once a 
protection determination has been deemed lawful, and the Security Certificate upheld as 
reasonable, the named person is deportable with no further opportunity for appeal. 
The Security Certificate process has evolved somewhat from its inception in 1978 to its post-
2001 format. Each iteration has been more restrictive and secretive than the last. As of 2001, the 
Security Certificate process was effectively a secret trial. The Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration could apply for an order of non-disclosure of evidence on grounds of national 
security confidentiality. The Federal Court judge was authorized to hear the case in the absence 
of the named person or his counsel and to receive and rely on evidence that would be 
inadmissible in a court of law and which was not disclosed to the person concerned or his 
counsel. The named person was entitled only to a “summary of the information or evidence that 
enables them to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, but 
that does not include anything that in the opinion of the judge would be injurious to national 
security or to the safety of any person”.
9 The statutory criteria for deciding whether to permit 
                                                      
5 All persons named in Security Certificates to date have been male.  
6 IRPA s. 115(2)(b). 
7 A foreign national is a non-citizen without permanent resident status. The category includes asylum 
seekers, refugees who have not yet obtained permanent residence, lawful temporary residents, and non-
status migrants.  
8 IRPA, s. 84. 
9 IRPA s. 78. 4 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
the named person to attend his hearing, what to admit into evidence, what to disclose to the 
named person, what to include in the summary, and what to rely upon as probative, did not 
include any consideration of the named person’s ability to make full answer and defence to the 
allegations against him.
10 
Expulsion to Torture: Suresh and Ahani 
In May 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeals in two Security Certificate cases. 
Manickavasagem Suresh was a Tamil refugee named in a Security Certificate as a threat to 
national security on the grounds that he was a fundraiser for an organisation that had links to the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), known as the Tamil Tigers. Mansour Ahani was an 
asylum seeker whose refugee claim had not been determined prior to the issuance of a Security 
Certificate naming him as a threat to national security based on allegations that he was an 
assassin for the Iranian secret police.  
In both cases, the named persons claimed that expulsion would put them at substantial risk of 
torture at the hands of their respective governments, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention 
Against Torture. 
The issues before the Supreme Court of Canada encompassed both substantive and procedural 
questions. Chief amongst the former was the constitutionality of returning a person determined 
to constitute a threat to national security to a country where he faced a substantial risk of torture. 
The procedural aspects challenged the absence of notice and opportunity to respond to the 
Ministerial determination of whether to deport the named person. 
The Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decisions in Suresh v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration)
11 in January 2002, and 9/11 casts a long shadow over the judgement. The Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms prohibited 
return to torture in all but “exceptional circumstances”.
12 By leaving a notional door open to 
expel a person to face a substantial risk of torture in another country, the Court adopted a stance 
in stark contrast to the 1996 European Court of Human Rights decision in Chahal,
13 and in 
apparent contravention of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture (to which Canada is a 
party), and possibly jus cogens.
14 While the Court’s decision on this point has been widely 
criticised, it is probably fair to suppose that the Court expected that resort to the exception 
would remain in the realm of the hypothetical. If so, the Court was mistaken. Since the Suresh 
judgement, the Canadian government has invoked exceptional circumstances favouring return to 
torture in each Security Certificate case where the opportunity has arisen. 
On the procedural side, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that if a named person could 
establish a prima facie risk of torture upon return to the country of nationality, he was entitled to 
disclosure of evidence upon which the Minister intended to rely (subject to privilege). The 
named person must know the case against him, and have the opportunity to present evidence 
                                                      
10 IRPA s. 78. 
11 [2002] 1 SCR 3. The companion case of Ahani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 
72 adopted the reasoning in Suresh but reached a different outcome on the facts regarding whether Ahani 
had made out a prima facie risk of torture. 
12 Section 7 of the Charter states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person, 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with fundamental justice”. 
13 Chahal v. United Kingdom, (1996) 23 EHHR 413. 
14 For the Supreme Court of Canada’s discussion of applicable international law, see Suresh at paras. 59-
78.  THE CANADIAN SECURITY CERTIFICATE REGIME | 5 
 
and provide written submissions on the danger posed by his continued presence in Canada, and 
the risk of torture if deported. The Minister must provide written reasons dealing with the 
substantive issues.  
The Suresh decision only addressed the final phase of the process, which arose after a Security 
Certificate had already been upheld as reasonable, and involved the exercise of executive 
discretion by the Minister to deport the named person. It took another six years before the 
judicial assessment of the reasonableness of the Security Certificate itself came under scrutiny 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
15 the Supreme Court of Canada 
confronted constitutional challenges to the statutory possibility of indefinite (or at least 
indeterminate) detention of persons named in Security Certificates, as well as the 
characterisation of the judicial review of Security Certificates as a secret trial by secret 
evidence. On the issue of detention, the Supreme Court found that the absence of any detention 
review for foreign nationals until after the Security Certificate was reviewed by the Federal 
Court constituted a violation of the constitutional right against arbitrary detention. The Court 
insisted that the Charter requires “a meaningful process of ongoing review that takes into 
account the context and the circumstances of the individual case”.
16 The Court lists a variety of 
factors that are relevant to determining the need for ongoing detention, but evades entirely the 
scenario of a detained person who is alleged to constitute a threat to national security, but who 
cannot be deported in the foreseeable future because of a substantial risk of torture. Is it 
constitutionally justified to detain a person indefinitely when there is no actually discernable 
prospect of deportation? The Supreme Court of Canada ventures no further than adverting 
obliquely to the “possibility of a judge concluding at some point that a particular detention 
constitutes cruel and unusual treatment or is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice”.
17 Although four of five men subject to security certificates were released on strict 
conditions by January 2007 (the fifth was ordered release, subject to negotiations that have yet 
to be concluded as of the time of writing), the average time in custodial detention was almost 
six years.
18  
Prof. Kent Roach astutely characterises the Supreme Court’s approach to detention as an 
instance of what Prof. Cass Sunstein dubs “judicial minimalism”: courts avoid ruling on the 
legality of an uncircumscribed legal power (in this case, a statutory power to detain with no 
temporal limitation). Instead, the Courts reserve the authority to proceed incrementally, offering 
the prospect of relief if and when the exercise of legal power in a particular case strays beyond 
constitutional limits.
19 As Prof. Roach observes, this approach “leaves the existing legislation 
intact but uncertain as both detainees and governments wait and speculate about the particular 
point of time in which courts will conclude that detention has become constitutionally 
                                                      
15 [2007] 1 SCR 350. 
16 Charkaoui, para. 107. 
17 Charkaoui, para. 123. While the Supreme Court of Canada claims that its position is consistent with US 
and UK authorities, arguably it contradicts the dicta from these jurisdictions.  
18 See Craig Forcese and Lorne Waldman, Seeking Justice in an Unfair Process: Lessons from Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of “Special Advocates” in National Security 
Proceedings (Study commissioned by the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, with the 
financial support of the Courts Administration Service) (August 2007), 
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf. 
19 See Cass Sunstein, “Minimalism at War”, 2004, available at Social Science Research Network SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=629285. 6 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
excessive”.
20 Given that the subjects of security certificates (including Charkaoui himself) had, 
in fact, already languished in detention for several years, the Supreme Court’s hesitant approach 
seemed feeble.  
The Supreme Court of Canada did explicitly address the breach of fundamental justice entailed 
by judicial review of the security certificate. As the Court observed, the statutory scheme casts a 
cloak of secrecy over the content of the case against the named person, and withholds from him 
the opportunity to know or respond to it: 
Confidentiality is a constant preoccupation of the certificate scheme. The judge “shall 
ensure” the confidentiality of the information on which the certificate is based and of 
any other evidence if, in the opinion of the judge, disclosure would be injurious to 
national security or to the safety of any person: s. 78(b). At the request of either 
minister “at any time during the proceedings”, the judge “shall hear” information or 
evidence in the absence of the named person and his or her counsel if, in the opinion of 
the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any 
person: s. 78(e). The judge “shall provide” the named person with a summary of 
information that enables him or her to be reasonably informed of the circumstances 
giving rise to the certificate, but the summary cannot include anything that would, in 
the opinion of the judge, be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person: 
s. 78(h). Ultimately, the judge may have to consider information that is not included in 
the summary: s. 78(g). In the result, the judge may be required to decide the case, 
wholly or in part, on the basis of information that the named person and his or her 
counsel never see.  
The scheme imposes on the reviewing judge sole responsibility for testing the credibility of the 
secret evidence, which the judge discharges by putting questions to government counsel and 
witnesses. The judge cannot call or elicit evidence from the government. This task is wholly 
incongruous with the traditionally passive role of the common law judge, as Federal Court 
Justice Hugessen lamented in a speech excerpted in the Charkaoui judgement:  
We do not like this process of having to sit alone hearing only one part, and looking at 
the materials produced by only one party...  
If there is one thing that I learned in my practice at the Bar, and I have managed to 
retain it through all these years, it is that good cross-examination requires really careful 
preparation and a good knowledge of your case. And by definition, judges do not do 
that. ... we do not have any knowledge except what is given to us and when it is only 
given to us by one party we are not well suited to test the materials that are put before 
us.
21 
The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately validates Justice Hugessen’s concerns about the 
inadequacy of relying on judges to fill the gap left by the absence of the named person and his 
counsel. The Court determines that the scheme does not accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter, specifically the right of the named person to know 
and respond to the case against him: 
Under IRPA’s certificate scheme, the named person may be deprived of access to some 
or all of the information put against him or her, which would deny the person the 
ability to know the case to meet. Without this information, the named person may not 
be in a position to contradict errors, identify omissions, challenge the credibility of 
                                                      
20 Kent Roach, “Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and Dialogue 
Between Courts and Legislatures”, (2008) 42, Supreme Court Law Review 281, p. 307. 
21 J. Hugessen, quoted in Charkaoui at para. 36. THE CANADIAN SECURITY CERTIFICATE REGIME | 7 
 
informants or refuge false allegations. This problem is serious in itself. It also underlies 
the concerns, discussed above, about the independence and impartiality of the 
designated judge, and the ability of the judge to make a decision based on the facts and 
law … 
The named person may know nothing of the case to meet, and although technically 
afforded an opportunity to be heard, may be left in a position of having no idea as to 
what needs to be said.
22 
Canadian constitutional law, in common with many other jurisdictions, subjects rights 
infringing conduct to a proportionality test. In Canada, the proportionality test occurs after a 
litigant has proven a rights violation on a balance of probabilities, whereupon the burden shifts 
to the government to justify the limitation. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter provides that “the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by laws as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society”.
23 The Supreme Court of Canada was easily satisfied that the 
“protection of Canada’s national security and related intelligence sources undoubtedly 
constitutes a pressing and substantial objective”, and that the restrictions imposed under the 
Security Certificate regime were rationally connected to the attainment of that objective. Its 
attention turned swiftly to the next stage of the analysis, which inquires into the existence of less 
restrictive alternatives to the impugned provisions. The principle at stake is that a given 
restriction on a constitutional right may be disproportionate where less restrictive alternatives 
exist for meeting the otherwise valid objective.  
The Supreme Court of Canada surveyed a range of precedents – both domestic and foreign – for 
dealing with the competing demands of national security confidentiality and the fairness 
requirement that affected persons know and respond to the case against them. Unfortunately, 
some of the accounts of past practice regarding Security Certificates and of practices developed 
in different Canadian contexts were either inaccurate or incomplete.
24 The Supreme Court noted 
a past instance where counsel for a criminal accused obtained access to security-sensitive 
material on an initial undertaking not to divulge it to the accused or anyone else. It arguably 
gave unduly short shrift to the possibility of disclosure to security-cleared counsel representing 
the person concerned. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada failed to advert to precedents 
where an independent, security-cleared counsel was entitled to full disclosure of relevant secret 
evidence and could also communicate thereafter with the person concerned and/or the person’s 
counsel in order to pose questions, glean avenues of inquiry and sources of evidence, and 
formulate bases upon which to test the government’s evidence (including calling its own 
witnesses).
25 Crucially, this post-disclosure communication with the named person and/or the 
person’s counsel was achieved by counsel without divulging the content of the secret 
information to the named person, and with no subsequent allegations of advertent or inadvertent 
‘leaks’ of confidential information. 
                                                      
22 Charkaoui, at paras. 54-55. 
23 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
24 For further elaboration, see Audrey Macklin, “Tranjudicial Conversations about Security and Human 
Rights”, in Mark Walters (ed.), EU-Canada Security Relations: The Other Transatlantic, forthcoming.  
25 The two examples are the Arar Commission and the practice of the Security Intelligence Review 
Committee security-cleared counsel. While the Supreme Court of Canada adverts to both bodies, it fails 
to accurately depict their respective practices. See Macklin, supra note 24; Kent Roach, op. cit., pp. 293-
304; Forcese and Waldman, op. cit., pp. 360-367. 8 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Canada highlights the UK Special Advocate model. After the 
1996 European Court of Human Rights decision in Chahal v. UK,
26 in which the European 
Court ruled that the existing UK system violated the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the British government introduced the Special Advocate scheme. The Special Advocate system 
entails the appointment of a security-cleared counsel to “represent the interests of an appellant 
in any proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission from which the 
appellant and any legal representative of his are excluded”.
27 In its description, the Supreme 
Court of Canada draws particular attention to the provisions of the UK scheme that prohibit the 
special advocate from communicating with the person concerned after seeing the protected 
information, unless the special advocate seeks permission from the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC), and the Secretary of State has an opportunity to object to the 
proposed communication before SIAC decides.
28 
The Supreme Court of Canada cites the positive academic reception to the special advocate 
model, while noting that the system has also been subject to criticism for the barriers to 
communication with the person concerned or his counsel, the inability of special advocates to 
call witnesses, and the lack of resourcing.
29 Despite these apparent weaknesses, the Supreme 
Court of Canada concludes by invoking SIAC’s own favourable commentary on the 
contribution of special advocates to its own successful operation. It even chided the Canadian 
government for not explaining to the Court why the drafters of the impugned Canadian 
legislation “did not provide for special counsel ... [as] is presently done in the United 
Kingdom.
30 Among the ‘less restrictive’ alternatives canvassed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, the UK scheme impaired the rights of the person concerned more than the others. Yet, a 
fair reading of the judgement conveys the impression that the Supreme Court of Canada was 
signalling its advance approbation not of the available option that impaired rights the least, but 
rather of the most restrictive of those less-restrictive alternatives. This might suggest that judges 
in one jurisdiction look for ‘political cover’ when striking down domestic legislation by 
pointing to less restrictive laws in another jurisdiction: if the Supreme Court of Canada 
endorsed existing UK practice, it could not be accused of making Canada a uniquely attractive 
haven for terrorists.  
Presented with a declaration of unconstitutionality from the Supreme Court of Canada, and a 
year within which to introduce a new and improved version, the Canadian government 
ultimately responded by introducing Bill C-3. The bill was predictable in its content. First, Bill 
C-3 remains silent on the so-called “Suresh exception” that countenances the legality of 
deporting a non-citizen to a country where he faces a substantial risk of torture. After all, since 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui did not resile from its prior dicta, the government 
faced no legal pressure to restrain the exercise of its discretion.  
Secondly, Bill C-3 extended the requirement of a semi-annual detention review to foreign 
nationals as well as to permanent residents (IRPA, s. 82). It more or less codified existing 
practice by Federal Court judges regarding the conditional release of Security Certificate 
detainees, a practice the Federal Court belatedly adopted once the British courts had set the 
precedent with their use of control orders in situations of long term detention in the absence of a 
                                                      
26 (1997) 23 EHRR 413. 
27 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, (UK) 1997, c. 68, s. 6. See Treasury Solicitors 
Department, “Special Advocates: A Guide to the Role of Special Advocates and the Special Advocates 
Support Office”, http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/attachments/Special_Advocates.pdf. 
28 Charkaoui, paras 80-81. 
29 Charkaoui, para. 83. 
30 Charkaoui, para. 84. THE CANADIAN SECURITY CERTIFICATE REGIME | 9 
 
reasonable prospect of removal.
31 However, it does not explicitly preclude indefinite detention. 
Nor does it articulate any factors relevant to the determination of whether to release 
(conditionally or otherwise), the appropriate conditions of release. Instead, the provisions 
reiterate that the risk to national security or endangerment of any person constitute reasons to 
detain, continue detention, or terminate conditional release in favour of custodial detention (ss. 
82, 82.1, 82.2). There is little doubt that the powers to detain non-citizens, to impose conditions 
on their release and to revoke conditional release, are much broader under IRPA than the peace 
bond, the nearest analogue under criminal law. A ‘peace bond’ is a long-standing instrument of 
the Canadian criminal justice system that imposes specific conditions on persons to protect the 
safety or property of others upon establishment of reasonable apprehension of future harmful 
conduct. Section 810.01 of the Criminal Code, enacted as part of Canada’s anti-terrorism 
legislation, empowers a provincial court judge to impose a ‘peace bond’ where reasonable 
grounds exist to believe that the person “will commit ... a terrorism offence”.
32 While potentially 
quite restrictive, the limitations on liberty available under a peace bond are not as draconian as 
those devised by Federal Court judges for purposes of conditional release under the Security 
Certificate regime. Secondly, the process for issuing and reviewing peace bonds is more 
transparent and more regular than for conditional release.
33 
Finally, the major innovation in Bill C-3 was the importation of a special advocate regime 
closely modelled on the UK precedent. By the time Bill C-3 was introduced, the government 
had the benefit of considerable commentary about the deficiencies of UK Special Advocate 
model. This included serious reservations expressed by Special Advocates themselves and by 
the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights and even a 
judgement of the House of Lords itself concerning control orders.
34 Various stakeholders, 
academics and advocates recommended amendments to Bill C-3 that would avoid or ameliorate 
the flaws in the UK law. Apart from relatively minor amendments, the government was 
unresponsive to these submissions. In the result, the Canadian system mimics its UK 
predecessor. 
The salient aspects of Bill C-3 in relation to Special Advocates are the following (all references 
are to IRPA): 
1.  The Minister of Justice must prepare a list of persons “who may act as Special Advocates” 
(s. 85.1). The Special Advocate’s role is “to protect the interests of the permanent resident 
or foreign national in a [Security Certificate] proceeding when information or other 
evidence is heard in the absence of the public, and of the named person and their counsel (s. 
85.1(1)).  
2.  The Minister must disclose to the Special Advocate “a copy of all information and other 
evidence that is provided to the judge but that is not disclosed to the permanent resident or 
foreign national and his counsel” (s. 85.4(1)). 
3.  The Special Advocate may challenge non-disclosure of evidence where the Minister asserts 
that disclosure would injure or endanger national security or the safety of any person (s. 
85.1(2)) 
                                                      
31 See Forcese and Waldman, op. cit., pp. 410-412. 
32 Refusal to enter into a peace bond or a breach of the bond constitute criminal offences are punishable 
by up to one year. 
33 See Forcese and Waldman, op. cit., pp. 411-12. 
34 See text accompanying notes 29-31, infra. 10 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
4.  The judge is authorized to receive into evidence and to rely on anything that “in the judge’s 
opinion is reliable and appropriate” even if inadmissible into a court of law” (ss. 83(h)) 
(emphasis added), but this does not include any material “that is believed on reasonable 
grounds to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture ... or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” (s. 83(1.1)) The judge shall not base a decision on 
information or evidence that the judge determines to be irrelevant (s. 83(h)).  
5.  The Special Advocate may challenge the relevance, cogency, sufficiency or weight of non-
disclosed evidence or information, and make oral and written submissions regarding that 
evidence or information (s. 85.1(b), 85.2(a)). 
6.  The Special Advocate may participate in hearings from which the named person and his 
counsel, and the public, are excluded; this includes the right to cross-examine witnesses 
who testify (s. 85.2(b)). 
7.  The Special Advocate may “exercise, with the judge’s authorization, any other powers that 
are necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign national” (s. 
85.2(c)). 
8.  After viewing information or evidence that is not disclosed to the permanent resident or 
foreign national or counsel, the Special Advocate requires judicial authorization (with or 
without conditions) to communicate with another person (s. 85.4(2), 85.5).  
9.  The Federal Court and Court of Appeal may make binding rules governing the practice and 
procedure in relation to the participation of Special Advocates in proceedings before the 
court (s. 85.6(1)). 
In light of the experience with the Special Advocate system in the UK, various aspects of the 
Canadian analogue give cause for concern.
35 Perhaps most significantly, the restriction on the 
Special Advocate’s communication with the named person and anyone else (including other 
Special Advocates) after viewing the secret evidence seriously hampers the Special Advocate’s 
capacity to do his or her job. A House of Commons and House of Lords Joint Committee on 
Human Rights summarised the frustration reported to the Committee by Special Advocates: 
The Special Advocates told us that the prohibition of communication with the 
controlled person frequently limits the very essence of their function of protecting their 
interests, because the Special Advocate may have no idea what the real case is against 
the person until the start of the closed proceedings, by which time it is too late to ask 
any questions of the controlled person to find out what explanations they might have. 
This was described as "extremely frustrating and counter-intuitive to the basic way that 
lawyers are used to doing their job". It was explained that the facility in the Rules to 
seek the Court's permission to consult with the controlled person was rarely used in 
                                                      
35 Bill C-3 does not explicitly require the Minister to disclose to the judge (and thereby the Special 
Advocate) the entire contents of its dossier. In the UK context, a comparable lacuna has led Special 
Advocates to complain that the government discloses only the information and evidence upon which they 
intend to rely, namely inculpatory evidence. Information that may be exculpatory, or may open up 
possible lines of inquiry leading toward exculpatory evidence, may be withheld from the Special 
Advocate. Although the Canadian legislation is no more helpful than its UK precedent, a follow-up case 
to the first Supreme Court of Canada decision in Charkaoui states that the Canadian Security Information 
Service “should be required to retain all the information in its possession and to disclose it to the 
ministers and the designated judge.” Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
2008 SCC 38, 26 June 2008, at para. 62. (Charkaoui II). The reference to all the information would 
appear to comprehend potentially exculpatory as well as inculpatory information and evidence. The 
extent to which the government acts in accordance with the spirit and letter of this dictum is difficult to 
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practice, partly because such permission was unlikely to be forthcoming in practice if 
the purpose of the meeting was to discuss anything to do with the closed case, and 
partly because the Rules require any application for such permission to be served on 
the Secretary of State, which is not considered tactically desirable because of the risk 
that it might give away to the opposing party the parts of the closed evidence in 
relation to which the controlled person does not have an explanation.
36 
The House of Lords subsequently validated the essence of Special Advocates’ objections in the 
following remarks by Lord Bingham in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB 
(FC):
37 
In any ordinary case, a client instructs his advocate what his defence is to the charges 
made against him, briefs the advocate on the weaknesses and vulnerability of the 
adverse witnesses, and indicates what evidence is available by way of rebuttal. This is 
a process which it may be impossible to adopt if the controlled person does not know 
the allegations made against him and cannot therefore give meaningful instructions, 
and the special advocate, once he knows what the allegations are, cannot tell the 
controlled person or seek instructions without permission, which in practice (as I 
understand) is not given. "Grave disadvantage" is not, I think, an exaggerated 
description of the controlled person's position where such circumstances obtain. 
…[T]he task of the court in any given case is to decide, looking at the process as a 
whole, whether a procedure has been used which involved significant injustice to the 
controlled person.
38 
Most recently, the European Court of Human Rights heard an appeal from the UK House of 
Lords in the Belmarsh case.
39 The European Court of Human Rights, inter alia, ruled on the 
adequacy of the Special Advocate model in relation to the procedural fairness guarantee 
contained in Article 5 § 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
40 Taking as a given 
that Special Advocates will be precluded from meeting with the named person after the former 
has viewed secret evidence, the Court found that “where the open material consisted purely of 
general assertions and SIAC’s decision to uphold the certification and maintain the detention 
was based solely or to a decisive degree on closed material, the procedural requirements of 
Article 5 § 4 would not be satisfied”.
41 
                                                      
36 UK House of Commons and House of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights, Nineteenth Report, 16 
July 2007, para. 201, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/jtrights/157/15709.htm 
37 [2007] UKHL 46.  
38 MB at para. 35. See also paras. 64-66 (per Baroness Hale: “I do not think that we can be confident that 
Strasbourg would hold that every control order hearing in which the special advocate procedure had been 
used …would be sufficient to comply with article 6 [of the ECtHR].… There is ample evidence from 
elsewhere of a tendency to over-claim the need for secrecy in terrorism cases … All must be alive to the 
possibility that the special advocates be given leave to ask specific and carefully tailored questions of the 
client. Although not expressly provided for in [the special advocate legislation], the special advocate 
should be able to call or have called witnesses to rebut the closed material. The nature of the case may be 
such that the client does not need to know all the details of the evidence in order to make an effective 
challenge”.) The MB case was heard just prior to the release of the Joint Committee Nineteenth Report. 
39 Case of A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application 3455/05, 19 February 2009 (European 
Court of Human Rights). 
40 Article 5 § 4 states, “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” 
41 Case of A., supra note 39 at para. 220. 12 | AUDREY MACKLIN 
 
In theory, the Special Advocate model adopted in Canada could ameliorate the aforementioned 
problems of restricted communication between the Special Advocate and the named person (as 
well as other Special Advocates) in two ways. First, designated judges could exercise their 
power to authorize communication in a facilitative manner on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, 
the Federal Court could exercise its statutory authority to devise binding rules governing the 
participation of Special Advocates (s. 85.6(1) that would establish parameters for 
communication between Special Advocates and named persons and/or their counsel, and among 
Special Advocates themselves. 
The short time that has passed since the Special Advocate regime was introduced in Canada 
gives equal cause for optimism and for pessimism that the system will create a meaningful right 
of non-citizens named in Security Certificates to know and respond to the case against them. 
The reason to be optimistic is that the lawyers appointed as Special Advocates thus far are 
extremely reputable, respected and experienced counsel drawn from the criminal and 
immigration bar. They include counsel who have represented persons named in Security 
Certificates. One has every reason to expect that they will assertively and zealously execute 
their responsibilities with full commitment to the objective of ensuring a just and fair process. 
The reason for pessimism is that that the Federal Court has still not exercised its authority to 
develop rules regarding the participation of Special Advocates (s. 85.6(1)). Such rules could, 
presumably, resolve at least some of the problems that the legislation creates through its silences 
and also its breadth.  
In the meantime, the Federal Court deflected a challenge to the constitutionality of the provision 
requiring judicial authorization prior to any communication between the Special Advocate and 
the named person after the former has viewed the secret evidence. In Almrei (Re),
42 Chief 
Justice Lutfy ruled that the issue was premature, because no Special Advocate had yet 
approached a judge for authorization in any particular case. This rejoinder misses the point, 
insofar as the issue before the court was whether advance judicial authorization ought to be 
required, not whether authorization was improperly denied in a particular case. The effect of this 
ruling is to perpetuate the judicial minimalism approach that has characterised judicial 
pronouncements to date: rather than grapple with the systemic impact of an advance judicial 
authorization requirement on the capacity of Special Advocates to perform their task, the ruling 
consigns Special Advocates and the Minister to a potentially endless series of protracted 
skirmishes over the granting or withholding of specific permission in particular situations, while 
the persons named in the Security Certificate languishes in detention or under the restraints of a 
conditional release.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The current Canadian system for naming and deporting non-citizens on grounds of national 
security reflects the influence of several salient trends in post- 9/11 policy making in Canada: 
judicial minimalism, the adoption of the most restrictive (as opposed to least restrictive) 
alternative that does not tip over into unconstitutionality, and the avoidance of political risk by 
following precedents already set by other jurisdictions. In this respect, the UK has been a clear 
source of inspiration for Canadian courts and parliamentarians regarding Special Advocates and 
control orders.  
Various Canadian commentators have advanced policy proposals for addressing the various 
challenges posed by the exigencies of national security and the imperatives of rights protection 
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for the objects of state suspicion.
43 Insofar as the focus of this brief is on the situation of non-
citizens, the main options consist of the following: 
1.  Non-Discrimination between Citizen and Non-Citizen 
To the extent that Canada subjects non-citizens to differential and worse procedures and 
consequences (including deportation to torture) than citizens alleged to engage in prohibited 
conduct, the government should simply deal with all alleged terrorism-related activity under 
criminal law, whether committed by citizens or non-citizens. Non-citizens who are 
convicted of criminal offences would ultimately remain deportable. The basic position 
would be that if the criminal law appropriately addresses the attainment of state objectives 
and the protection of individual rights with respect to citizens, then it must be capable of 
doing the same with respect to non-citizens as well. A fall-back position would be to resort 
to the criminal law at least in cases where the alternative was potentially indeterminate 
confinement or conditional release where deportation was not available because of the 
substantial risk of torture.  
2.  Amelioration of the Security Certificate Regime (Including Special Advocate Model) 
a)  Explicitly and absolutely prohibit deportation of non-citizens to countries where they 
face a substantial risk of torture 
b)  Elevate the standard of proof required to designate a person a risk to national security 
beyond “reasonable grounds to believe” to at least a civil standard (balance of 
probabilities)  
c)  Explicitly prohibit indefinite detention 
d)  Articulate criteria relevant to the termination of detention 
e)  Make the impact of non-disclosure on the fairness of the hearing a factor relevant to the 
determination of whether to admit, disclose and rely upon evidence for which the 
government asserts national security confidentiality 
f)  Require full disclosure by the government of evidence in its possession to the Special 
Advocate 
g)  Authorize the Special Advocate to question the named person after the Special 
Advocate has viewed the secret information; such questioning must and can be 
conducted in such a way as to avoid involuntary disclosure of the secret information.
44 
Although these proposals are specific to the Canadian regime, the larger questions of 
discrimination against non-citizens and the practical requirements imposed by the duty of 
fairness in the national security context hang over most states. Diverse courts and governments 
may arrive at different answers, and a search for perfection will doubtless remain elusive. While 
one should not let the best become the enemy of the good, nor should the absence of risk-free 
alternatives become the apologist for the bad.  
                                                      
43 See Forcese and Waldman, op. cit.; Kent Roach, op. cit.  
44 For further discussion of the necessity and feasibility of questioning by a Special Advocate of the name 
person following receipt of the secret information, see Forcese and Waldman, op. cit., pp. 63-64. 